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A common claim in debates about globalization is that economic integration increases worker 
insecurity.  Although this idea is central to both political and academic debates about 
international economic integration, the theoretical basis of the claim is often not clear.  There is 
also no empirical research that has directly tested the relationship.  In this paper, we argue that 
economic insecurity among workers may be related to riskier employment and/or wage 
outcomes, and that foreign direct investment may be a key factor contributing to this increased 
risk by making labor demands more elastic.  We present new empirical evidence, based on the 
analysis of panel data from Great Britain collected from 1991-1999, that FDI activity in the 
industries in which individuals work is positively correlated with individual perceptions of 
economic insecurity.  This relationship holds in yearly cross-sections, in a panel accounting for 
individual-specific effects, and in a dynamic panel model also accounting for individual-specific 
effects. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
  Across the world, there appears to be significant opposition to policies aimed at further 
liberalization of international trade, immigration, and foreign direct investment (FDI).  A large 
number of political events in recent years suggest a marked turn away from liberalization, and 
many prominent observers have raised alarms about this “globalization backlash.”
1 
  There is a growing body of research examining what political-economy forces underlie this 
backlash.  In Scheve and Slaughter (2001 a, b), we documented a strong cleavage between labor-
market skills and U.S. public preferences over trade and immigration policy.  Less-skilled 
individuals, measured by educational attainment or wages earned, are much more likely to 
oppose freer trade and immigration than their more-skilled counterparts. This finding is 
consistent with the distributive consequences of liberalization predicted by the factor endowment 
model.  We also found that many other possible cleavages, surprisingly, do not materialize.  
Across both trade and immigration preferences, no other cleavage is as consistently important as 
the skills divide. Subsequent research has documented this division in preferences about 
international economic liberalization across a wide number of countries, where the magnitude of 
the cleavage across countries varies in predictable ways according to national endowments and 
labor-market institutions (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Mayda and Rodrik 2001; Hayes, Ehrlich, 
and Peinhardt 2002; Dancygier 2002; Mayda 2002; Gabel 1998a, b; Scheve 2000).  Thus, the 
distributive consequences in the labor market for individuals with varying endowments of human 
capital seem to be one factor contributing to the backlash against globalization. 
                                                 
1 Examples of political events include public protests at virtually every meeting of international economic institutions beginning 
with the 1999 WTO meetings in Seattle.  In August, 2000, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan acknowledged that 
liberalization efforts have stalled out, with outbreaks of protectionism a distinct possibility:  “’Despite extraordinary prosperity, 
the ability to move forward on various trade initiatives has clearly come to a remarkable stall … there remains considerable 
unease among some segments [of society] about the way markets distribute wealth and about the effects of raw competition on 
society … it is quite imaginable that support for market-oriented resource allocation will wane and the latent forces of    2    
  
  These distributive arguments, however, largely focus on the relationship between 
international economic integration and the level and distribution of wages.  Another body of 
research has focused on whether globalization has increased individual economic insecurity. This 
line of research recognizes that risk-averse workers are concerned not only about the level but 
also the volatility of their earnings—in particular, volatility from the risk of unemployment. 
  Economic insecurity may contribute to the globalization backlash in at least two ways. First, 
there is the potential for a direct effect, very similar to that documented for the skill divide in 
opinion formation about international economic policies. Individuals that perceive globalization 
contributing to their own economic insecurity are much more likely to develop policy attitudes 
hostile towards economic integration. Second, a number of scholars have argued that increases in 
economic insecurity from globalization may generate demands for more generous social 
insurance that compensates workers for a riskier environment (e.g. Rodrik 1997; Garrett 1998; 
Burgoon 2001; Hayes, Ehrlich, and Peinhardt 2002; Boix 2002). However, many scholars have 
also suggested that globalization limits the capacities of governments to provide such 
compensation (e.g. Rodrik 1997; Desai 1999; Besley, Griffith, and Klemm 2001). Thus, 
individuals may develop concerns about globalization because they believe it reduces the 
insurance provided by the state for all labor market risks, including those heightened by global 
integration. 
  The claim that international economic integration increases economic insecurity and thus 
contributes to political conflict over globalization is, however, highly contested.  Rodrik (1997) 
presents evidence that exposure to external risk, measured by the interaction between trade 
openness and the standard deviation of a country’s terms of trade, is positively correlated with 
                                                                                                                                                             
protectionism and state intervention will begin to reassert themselves in many countries, including the United States.’” 
(Stevenson 2000).    3    
  
both growth volatility and government expenditures.  From this Rodrik concludes that 
globalization increases economic insecurity and thus demands for a robust welfare state. 
  Iversen and Cusack (2000) argue that it is not sufficient to show that international-price 
volatility is correlated with growth volatility and government spending.  Rather, they claim it is 
necessary either that price volatility in international markets be greater than in domestic markets 
or that trade concentrates more than it diversifies economic risks.  Iversen and Cusack then 
present evidence that, at least for advanced economies, there is no correlation between trade- or 
capital-market openness and volatility in output, earnings, or employment.  They therefore 
dismiss both the argument that globalization increases economic insecurity and the claim that 
this connection leads to demands for welfare-state growth.  Similar differences in methodology 
and conclusions to those between Rodrik and Iversen and Cusack are found in many of the 
contributors to this debate (e.g. Garrett 1998a, b; Burgoon 2001; Garrett and Mitchell 2001; 
Hayes, Ehrlich, and Peinhardt 2002; Swank 2002; McLaren and Newman 2002; Cameron and 
Kim 2001). 
  While this line of research has investigated reasonable hypotheses about how globalization 
may increase economic insecurity and thus demands for a robust welfare state, we have two 
broad concerns about this approach.  The first is theoretical.  It is actually not necessary for 
globalization to increase the magnitude of price and/or technology shocks for integration to 
increase individual economic insecurity in terms of riskier employment and/or wage outcomes. 
Thus, a lack of correlation between volatility in terms-of-trade and volatility in employment, 
wages, and output does not necessarily imply that globalization has not contributed to increased 
economic insecurity.  In this paper, we present a simple model of a competitive labor market that    4    
  
clarifies this point by illustrating the key mechanism—labor-demand elasticities—through which 
we believe globalization may increase economic insecurity. 
  Our second concern is methodological.  The theoretical connection between globalization 
and economic insecurity is an individual-level phenomenon, as is the subsequent connection to 
increased demands for a robust welfare state.  All the empirical work we know of, however, 
employs aggregate country-level data to indirectly test this individual-level phenomenon.  We 
know of no individual-level empirical study of whether exposure to the world economy increases 
worker insecurity.
2  Thus, a theoretically informed individual-level test of the prediction that 
globalization generates insecurity is lacking both in the political-economy literature on the forces 
underlying the backlash against globalization and in the literature on the connection between 
globalization and the welfare state.  
  In this paper, we present a theoretical model clarifying a critical mechanism through which 
globalization can increase individual economic insecurity.  Drawing on standard frameworks of 
labor economics, we argue that FDI by multinational enterprises (MNEs) may be an important 
factor generating worker insecurity.  FDI by MNEs may increase firms’ elasticity of demand for 
labor.  More-elastic labor demands, in turn, raise the volatility of wages and employment, all of 
which tends to make workers feel more insecure.  It is important to note that this link from 
higher labor-demand elasticities to greater labor-market volatility does not require any change in 
aggregate shocks to the labor market: it holds even for some fixed amount of aggregate volatility. 
  Our emphasis on FDI as the key mechanism by which globalization generates economic 
insecurity is rare in the literature. The relative lack of attention on FDI is unfortunate because in 
                                                 
2  This does not imply that the aggregate-level analyses and methodological debates are without merit.  We only show that an 
increase in price volatility is not essential in order to argue that globalization increases worker insecurity.  Nevertheless, it is not 
clear that there is a enough information in the aggregate data to make conclusive inferences about the correlations of interest.  
See, for example, Hayes, Ehrlich, and Peinhardt’s (2002) demonstration of the sensitivity of estimates to changes in model 
specification to deal with selection problems in the aggregate analyses.    5    
  
recent decades, cross-border flows of FDI have grown at much faster rates than have flows of 
goods and services or people.
3  Moreover, it is the multinationalization of production which a 
number of scholars have pointed to as the distinguishing feature of the current phase of 
globalization compared to previous episodes (Bordo, Eichengreen, and Irwin 1999).  Finally, the 
lack of focus on FDI is surprising because, as we demonstrate, there are strong theoretical 
reasons to believe that, through its effect on labor-demand elasticities, it substantially influences 
economic insecurity among workers by increasing employment and earnings risks. 
  This theoretical framework then motivates our empirical test of the relationship between the 
multinationalization of production and the economic insecurity of workers.  We present new 
evidence, based on the analysis of panel data from Great Britain collected from 1991-1999, that 
FDI activity in the industries in which individuals work is positively correlated with individual 
perceptions of economic insecurity.  This relationship holds in yearly cross-sections, in a panel 
accounting for individual-specific effects, and in a dynamic panel model also accounting for 
individual-specific effects.  Consequently, it is not only true that individuals more exposed to 
FDI activity are more likely to report greater insecurity. It is also the case that changes in 
exposure for a single individual, controlling for previous levels of insecurity, are correlated with 
changes in worker insecurity. We regard the individual-level panel results as the first valid 
evidence consistent with a causal relationship between globalization and worker insecurity. 
  There are four remaining sections to the paper.  The next section provides a theoretical 
framework for the economics of worker insecurity.  Section 3 describes the data to be used in the 
study and the econometric models to be estimated.  Section 4 reports the empirical results and 
the final section concludes. 
                                                 
3 UNCTAD (2001) reports that from 1986 through 2000, worldwide cross-border outflows of FDI rose at an annualized rate of 
26.2%, versus a rate of just 15.4% for worldwide exports of goods and services.  In the second half of the 1990s this difference    6    
  
 
2.  Theoretical Framework for Worker Insecurity, Labor-Demand Elasticities, and FDI 
2.1  Defining Worker Insecurity 
  Although there are a number of alternative definitions of economic insecurity, most often it is 
understood to be an individual’s perception of the risk of economic misfortune (Dominitz and 
Manski 1997).  Consequently, researchers have focused on the risk of events such as the loss of 
health insurance, being a victim of a burglary, losing a job, and significant decreases in wages.  
Some analysts have distinguished between perceptions of the risk of such events and the actual 
anxiety and stress caused by the risk (Anderson and Pontusson 2001, Gardner and Oswald 2001, 
Mughan and Lacy 2002). 
  For our research this distinction is very important because, as will be discussed below, our 
key measure of economic insecurity addresses most directly the anxiety/stress dimension.   
Consistent with many researchers in this area, we will assume that perceptions of risk do 
generate anxiety, and thus that our stress/anxiety measure is linked to the perceptions of 
economic misfortune.  There are likely individual characteristics and environmental factors that 
influence this link (OECD 1997, Anderson and Pontusson 2001, Mughan and Lacy 2002), and 
one important task for our empirical analysis will be to address this. 
  It is likely that most people’s perceptions of economic insecurity depend heavily on their 
purchasing power, which in turn depends on both their asset ownership and their labor-market 
status—both employment and income earned therefrom.  In reality, the large majority of people 
rely much more on labor income than capital income for purchases; accordingly, we think labor-
market status is the main determinant of perceptions of economic insecurity. 
                                                                                                                                                             
widened to 37.0% versus just 1.9%.    7    
  
  In light of this labor-market focus, we conjecture that the economic misfortunes underlying 
people’s economic insecurity stem mainly from more-volatile employment and/or wage 
interactions with their employers.  That is, risk-averse workers are not indifferent between 
employment options that yield the same amount of expected earnings but with differing degrees 
of certainty.  More-certain earnings outcomes—due to more-certain wage and/or employment 
realizations—are preferred to less-certain ones, and insecurity rises with this uncertainty.
4  
2.2  Worker Insecurity in Labor-Market Equilibrium 
  Figure 1 visualizes equilibrium in a standard competitive labor market.  The vertical axis 
plots wages, and the horizontal axis employment (measured in people or, if issues like overtime 
are thought to be important, hours).
5 
  The labor-supply curve, LS, is aggregated across individuals, and is typically assumed to be 
upward sloping.  At each point along the supply schedule, the elasticity of labor supply, ηS, is 
defined as the percentage change in the quantity of labor supplied by workers in response to a 
one-percent increase in the price of labor.  An increase in wages is typically thought to generate 
both a substitution effect and an income effect among persons who work.  Higher wages raise the 
opportunity cost of choosing leisure rather than work, and thus induce people to substitute 
towards more work.  But higher wages also raise total income from the initial amount of work, 
and thus induce people to work less and choose more leisure.  The substitution effect typically 
                                                 
4 It is important to note that there is now a large body of evidence that labor-market volatility has been rising in many countries, 
especially in the 1990s, in terms of greater earnings volatility, declining job tenure, and self reports.  Gottschalk and Moffitt 
(1994) report substantial increases in year-to-year earnings volatility for the United States over the 1970s and 1980s.  Looking at 
the 1990s as well, a symposium issue of the Journal of Labor Economics (1999) documented declines in U.S job stability, 
especially in the 1990s for large groups of workers such as those with more tenure.  Within that symposium issue, Schmidt’s 
(1999) analysis of individual surveys finds that U.S. workers in the 1990s were more pessimistic about losing their jobs than they 
were during the 1980s.  A wide range of surveys have found evidence of rising U.S. job insecurity over the 1990s relative to 
earlier decades, despite the ongoing economic expansion (e.g., Bronfenbrenner 2000).   
5 For a formal derivation of key labor-market concepts such as elasticities, see Hamermesh (1993). For discussion of labor-
demand elasticities in general equilibrium trade models, see Reddy (2000).     8    
  
dominates, and thus higher wages induce more work.  Aggregated across workers, LS thus 
slopes up. 
  The labor-demand curve, LD, is aggregated across firms, and is typically assumed to be 
downward sloping.  At each point along the demand schedule, the elasticity of labor demand, 
ηD, is defined as the percentage decline (in absolute value) in the quantity of labor demanded by 
that firm in response to a one-percent increase in the price of labor.  This elasticity consists of 
two parts.  One is the substitution effect.  It tells, for a given level of output, how much the firm 
substitutes away from labor towards other factors of production when wages rise.  The second is 
the scale effect.  It tells how much labor demand changes after a wage change thanks to the 
change in the firm's output.  Higher wages imply higher costs and thus, moving along the 
product-market demand schedule, lower firm output.  When wages rise, both the substitution and 
scale effects reduce the quantity of labor demanded.  The firm substitutes away from labor 
towards other factors, and with higher costs the firm produces less such that it demands less of 
all factors, including labor. 
  Labor-market equilibrium prevails at the intersection of LD and LS at point E, where the 
quantity of labor supplied equals the quantity of labor demanded.  At that point, suppose that ηS 
and ηD are the relevant elasticities.  We introduce volatility into the labor market by assuming 
that the position of the LD schedule is stochastic.  This accords with a wide range of empirical 
evidence that labor-market volatility stems mainly from movements in LD rather than LS. 
  To see what forces drive volatility in LD, note that the labor demand schedule for each firm 
traces out the marginal revenue product of its workers as the wage rate varies.  Each profit-
maximizing firm hires workers until the wage paid to the last worker hired just equals the value 
of output—i.e., revenue—generated by that last worker.  Vary the wage facing the firm, and the    9    
  
optimal number of workers to hire by this maximization rule varies.  For each firm, the product 
prices and technology it faces are two key determinants of marginal revenue products. 
   Aggregated across all firms, then, the position of the LD schedule depends crucially on all 
relevant product prices and production technologies.  Movements in prices and technologies 
trigger movements in LD and thus in equilibrium wages and/or employment.  Define 
∧
mrp as the 
percentage shift in the LD schedule due to shocks to prices and/or technologies.  It is then 
straightforward to show that the resulting percentage change in equilibrium wages and 
employment are respectively given by 
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  For workers, the critical issue to note in the above expressions is that volatility in labor-
market outcomes depends not just on the volatility of LD shifters such as product prices and 
production technology.  It also depends on the magnitudes of the elasticities of labor supply and 
demand.  If elasticities are assumed to be fixed, then greater labor-market volatility arises if and 
only if there is greater aggregate volatility in prices or technology.  But this is not the only way 
to generate greater labor-market volatility.  It can also be generated from increasing the elasticity 
of demand for labor, holding fixed the amount of aggregate risk.  For some given values of 
) (
∧
mrp Var  and ηS, as ηD rises so too does  ) (
∧
w Var  and  ) (
∧
e Var .  Higher labor-demand 
elasticities trigger more-volatile labor-market responses to price or technology shocks to labor 
demand.    10    
  
      This can be envisioned graphically by comparing the consequences for wages and 
employment of equal shifts in the labor demand curves LD and LD′ in Figure 1. In this figure, an 
increase in labor demand elasticity—perhaps induced by globalization as will be discussed 
below—would appear as a flattening of the labor demand schedule around the point E. LD′ is 
one such labor demand schedule.  For an equal shift in LD and LD′ from a shock to prices and/or 
technology, there is a greater adjustment in wages and employment along the LD′ schedule 
characterized by more elastic demand. 
  For risk-averse workers, all this means that more-elastic labor demands should tend to raise 
economic insecurity.  In the introduction, we highlighted the ongoing question about whether 
globalization increases aggregate risk—shocks to prices and/or technologies.  Our simple 
framework here clarifies that for issues of worker insecurity, the answer need not be “yes.”  But 
in that case, the important question to ask becomes whether globalization makes labor demands 
more elastic. 
2.3  How FDI by MNEs Can Make Labor Demands More Elastic:  Theory and Evidence 
  Standard models in international trade predict that greater FDI by MNEs should make labor 
demands more elastic through both the scale and substitution effects.  This should boost 
insecurity via the greater labor-market volatility just described.  Consider each effect in turn. 
  Many models predict that FDI and its related international trade make product markets more 
competitive.  Through the scale effect, this should make labor demands more elastic.  For 
example, liberalization of FDI policies can force domestic firms to face heightened foreign 
competition.  Or developments abroad related to MNEs (e.g., capital accumulation via FDI) can 
be communicated to domestic producers as more-intense foreign competition.  In these cases 
more competitive product markets mean that a given increase in wages and thus costs translate    11    
  
into larger declines in output and thus demand for all factors.  Different models predict different 
magnitudes of FDI and/or trade’s impact on product-market demand.
6 
  The second way through which FDI can increase labor-demand elasticities is through the 
substitution effect.  Suppose that a firm is vertically integrated with a number of production 
stages.  Stages can move abroad either within firms as multinationals establish foreign affiliates 
(e.g., Helpman 1984) or arm's length by importing the output of those stages from other firms 
(e.g., Feenstra and Hanson 1997).  Globalization of production thus gives firms access to foreign 
factors of production as well as domestic ones, either directly through foreign affiliates or 
indirectly through intermediate inputs.  This expands the set of factors firms can substitute 
towards in response to higher domestic wages beyond just domestic non-labor factors to include 
foreign factors as well.  Thus, greater FDI raises labor-demand elasticities. 
  In the literature on globalization and labor markets, there are several recent studies indicating 
that MNEs and FDI influence labor-demand elasticities in the ways just discussed.  Using 
industry-level data for U.S. manufacturing, Slaughter (2001) estimates that demand for 
production labor became more elastic from 1960 to the early 1990s, and that these increases were 
correlated with FDI outflows by U.S.-headquartered MNEs.  Using plant-level data for all U.K. 
manufacturing from 1973 to 1992, Fabbri, Haskel, and Slaughter (2002) estimate that both U.K.-
multinational plants and foreign-owned plants as well each had larger increases than did U.K. 
domestic plants in the elasticity of demand for production labor.  They also estimate that 
increases were driven largely by greater substitutability between production labor and materials. 
                                                 
6 One example is a monopolistically-competitive industry producing for Dixit-Stiglitz consumers who value product variety (e.g., 
Helpman and Krugman, 1985). Here the representative firm is usually assumed to face a demand elasticity (greater than one) that 
equals the elasticity of substitution (EOS) among product varieties in consumers' utility function.  But the actual demand 
elasticity is only approximately equal to the EOS.  It equals EOS plus a second term, 
(1-EOS)
N   , where N is the number of firms 
in the industry.  As N rises—thanks, for example, to FDI by foreign MNEs—so, too, does this elasticity.    12    
  
  One important margin on which MNEs may affect elasticities is on the extensive margin of 
plant shutdowns.  In response to wage increases, MNEs may be more likely than domestic firms 
to respond by closing entire plants.  Evidence that multinational plants are more likely to close 
than are domestically owned plants has now been documented for the manufacturing sectors in at 
least three countries.  For the United Kingdom, Fabbri, et al (2002) estimate that multinational 
plants—again, both U.K.- and foreign-owned—are more likely to shut down than domestic 
plants are (conditional on a set of operational advantages enjoyed by multinationals that make 
them less likely to shut down, like being older and larger).  Gorg and Strobl (2002) find that 
foreign-owned plants in Irish manufacturing are more likely to exit.  And for the United States, 
Bernard and Jensen (2002) report higher death probabilities for plants owned by firms that hold 
at least 10% of their assets outside the United States. 
2.4  Summary of Theory Framework  
  To summarize, standard economic models of labor markets suggest that the globalization of 
production via MNEs may increase labor-demand elasticities.  This, in turn, will tend to make 
labor-market outcomes more volatile and thus workers more insecure.  This analysis suggests an 
empirical test of whether individual self-assessments of economic insecurity are related to FDI 
exposure in the labor market.  The remainder of this paper turns to this empirical test. 
  Before doing that, we want to note one other important aspect of MNEs and labor markets.  
Several studies—of both developed and developing countries—have documented that 
establishments owned by MNEs pay higher wages than do domestically owned establishments.  
This is true even controlling for a wide range of observable worker and/or plant characteristics 
such as industry, region, and overall size.  The magnitudes involved are big.  Doms and Jensen 
(1998) document that for U.S. manufacturing plants in 1987, worker multinational wages    13    
  
exceeded domestically owned wages by a range of 5 to 15 percent, with larger differentials being 
enjoyed by production workers rather than non-production workers.
7 
   What accounts for this “multinational wage premium” remains unknown, largely because this 
cross-sectional evidence is consistent with several alternative explanations, about which very 
little is currently known.  The premium could be accounted for by higher worker productivity 
due to superior technology and/or capital at multinationals; or by higher worker productivity due 
to unobservable worker qualities; or by multinationals being more profitable and therefore able 
to share more rents with workers.  Our framework in this section suggests another possibility:  
that MNEs pay more to compensate workers for the greater labor-market volatility associated 
with MNEs—e.g., for the greater risk of plant shut-downs.  If workers for MNEs face a greater 
risk of job separation because MNEs have more elastic labor demands than purely domestic 
firms do, then to compensate they may receive higher wages. 
  Regardless of the cause(s) of the multinational wage premium, its existence is very important 
for considering how the globalization of production affects economic insecurity.  All else equal, 
this premium is very likely to make multinational employees feel more economically secure.  
Our focus on elasticities and labor-market volatility highlights MNE influences on different 
dimensions of the overall worker-firm relationship.  These contrasting issues of labor-demand 
elasticities and wage premia suggest that the net impact of MNEs on worker insecurity is ex ante 
unclear.  Whether the wage premiums are sufficient to compensate workers for increases in risks 
from higher elasticities is an empirical question. 
 
                                                 
7 Production workers receive an average of 6.9 percent less at comparable domestic plants employing more than 500 employees 
and 15.2 percent less at comparable domestic plants employing fewer than 500 employees.  Non-production workers receive an 
average of 5.0 percent less at comparable domestic plants employing more than 500 employees and 9.5 percent less at 
comparable domestic plants employing fewer than 500 employees.  For additional U.S. evidence see Howenstine and Zeile    14    
  
3.  Data Description and Empirical Specification 
3.1  Data Description 
  The objective of our empirical work is to examine the impact of international capital mobility 
on economic insecurity.  Specifically, we evaluate how individual self-assessments of economic 
insecurity correlate with the presence of highly mobile capital in the form of FDI in the 
industries in which individuals work.  Our data cover Great Britain, which we think is an 
excellent case to examine both because inward and outward FDI have long figured prominently 
in the overall U.K. economy and because of the high quality of data available. 
  The individual data are from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) (2001).  This study 
is a nationally-representative sample of more than 5,000 U.K. households and over 9,000 
individuals surveyed annually from 1991 to 1999.
8  It records detailed information about each 
respondent’s perceptions of economic insecurity, employment, wages, and many other 
characteristics.  The most important pieces of survey information required for the analysis in this 
section is a measure of economic insecurity, identification of the respondents’ industry of 
employment, and repeated measurement of the same individual over time. 
  We measure economic insecurity by responses to the following question asked in each of the 
nine years of the panel. 
“I’m going to read out a list of various aspects of jobs, and after each one I’d like 
you to tell me from this card which number best describes how satisfied or 
dissatisfied you are with that particular aspect of your own present job—job 
security.” 
 
The ordered responses are on a seven-point scale ranging from “not satisfied at all” to 
“completely satisfied.”  As discussed in the previous section, economic insecurity is most often 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1994).  Griffith (1999) presents similar evidence for the United Kingdom; Globerman, et al (1994) for Canada; Aitken et al 
(1996) for Mexico and Venezuela; and Te Velde and Morrissey (2001) for five African countries. 
8 The BHPS is ongoing but our data are through 1999 only.    15    
  
in the literature understood either to be an individual’s perception of the risk of economic 
misfortune and/or to be the anxiety or stress caused by the risk.  We interpret our BHPS question 
as measuring the latter concept, as it has individuals report on their (dis)satisfaction with job 
security rather than on job security per se.  We follow previous studies in assuming that 
perceptions of economic insecurity generate anxiety or lack of satisfaction, and thus that our 
BHPS question correlates with individual economic insecurity—albeit mediated by individual 
characteristics and environmental factors. 
  Using our BHPS question, we constructed the variable Insecurity by coding responses in the 
reverse order from the original question with a range from 1 for individuals who give the 
response “completely satisfied” to a 7 for those individuals giving the response “not satisfied at 
all.”  Higher values of Insecurity thus indicate less satisfaction with job security. 
  Our theoretical framework hypothesizes that high FDI activity in industries may generate 
economic insecurity among workers in those industries by increasing labor-demand elasticities.  
To test this hypothesis, we constructed the variable FDI to measure FDI exposure.  We obtained 
data about inward and outward FDI investment positions in all 2-digit 1992 Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC92) industries for the U.K. from 1991 to 1999.
9  Since the BHPS records the 
industry the respondent is employed in according to the 1980 Standard Industry Classification 
(SIC80), we concorded the FDI data to 2-digit SIC80 industries.
10  We then merged the industry-
level FDI data with the BHPS survey. 
 The  variable  FDI is a dichotomous industry-level variable that we set equal to one if two 
conditions were met:  if the industry had any positive FDI investment, inward or outward, and if 
                                                 
9 This data was obtained directly from the Office of National Statistics. We thank Simon Harrington for his assistance in 
generating this data. 
10 The BHPS records industry of employment according to the SIC80 classification scheme in all years but does report this 
information according to the SIC92 system in two years.    16    
  
the industry’s activities do not require producers and consumers to be in the same geographic 
location.  If either of these conditions were not met, we coded FDI equal to zero. 
  Our logic in defining FDI with these two conditions runs as follows.  The first condition for 
an individual’s industry of employment to have positive FDI investment is straightforward.  Any 
inward or outward FDI activity satisfies this.
11  The second condition recognizes that FDI 
activity is less likely to alter labor-demand elasticities if business activities cannot be outsourced 
across countries because the consumer and producer must be in the same geographic location.  
Consider the examples of wholesale trade, retail trade, and personal services (e.g., haircuts).  The 
large majority of business activities in these industries require the co-location of producers and 
consumers:  customers interacting with sales clerks, or sitting in the barber’s chair.  The notions 
of economic insecurity related to FDI that we discussed in Section 2 focus on the ability of 
MNEs to shift business activities across countries (i.e., on the substitution effect).  In reality, in 
many industries, FDI does not have this characteristic; indeed, this FDI arises precisely because 
foreign customers cannot be served at a distance via international trade.  Accordingly, our FDI 
variable identifies not all industries with FDI, but instead only those industries with FDI in which 
business activities can be outsourced across countries.  So for industries such as wholesale trade, 
retail trade, and personal services we coded FDI as zero regardless of the data on actual FDI. 
  It is important to recognize the level of aggregation for the FDI regressor.  The 2-digit SIC80 
level we use is dictated by the FDI data available from the U.K. Office of National Statistics.  
Theoretically, we could imagine a more specific FDI exposure regressor that indicated FDI 
activity at the level of the respondent’s company, rather than at the more-aggregated industry 
                                                 
11 It is theoretically ambiguous if, in addition to the existence of FDI activity, the actual amount matters. Moreover, it is not clear, 
given that both inward and outward FDI must be measured, how to normalize the amount of activity across sectors. Thus, for 
both theoretical and empirical considerations, we employ a dichotomous measure. We discuss alternative measures of FDI 
exposure in Section 4.    17    
  
level.
12  Our specification implicitly mixes the FDI activity of firms within each industry, and 
thereby assumes that within each industry the individual perceives any threat from FDI equally 
regardless of whether s/he works for a firm with foreign investment activity.  This assumption 
seems reasonable.  We are simply assuming that the labor-demand schedule faced by workers is 
set in the industry of employment rather than the firm or, for that matter, the entire economy.
13 
  Given that our dependent variable measures the anxiety generated by economic insecurity, 
rather than that economic insecurity per se, it is critical that we control for differences among 
individuals in the link between the risk of economic misfortune and the stress caused by such 
risk.  Previous research has suggested that there is systematic variation in perceptions of 
economic insecurity across demographic groups. 
  For our baseline cross-sectional analysis, we constructed four standard controls.  The variable 
Income is equal to annual household income in thousands of U.K. pounds.
14  Education is a 
categorical variable ranging from one to four, with higher values indicating increasing 
educational attainment.
15  The variable Gender is equal to one for female respondents and zero 
for males.  Finally, the variable Age equals the respondent’s age in years at the time of survey.   
  Each of these control variables is likely to account for some of the differences among 
individuals in perceptions of economic insecurity in general, and in the link between the risk of 
job misfortune and the resulting anxiety generated in particular. However, it must be 
acknowledged that other unmeasured or unobservable differences among individuals may matter.  
                                                 
12 Of course, this is only a theoretical possibility.  Even if we had firm-level FDI data, it would not be usable because the BHPS 
does not report the respondent’s firm. 
13 Our focus on industries as the relevant aggregate for labor market effects is also consistent with many empirical findings in the 
labor-economics literature. For example, a common finding in studies of profit-sharing is that wage-bargaining keys off of 
industry profits above and beyond firm considerations. Of course, over longer time horizons than we consider in this paper, 
workers should be assumed to be facing an economy-wide labor demand curve. 
14 Annual household income is a variable calculated by the BHPS to include income from all sources in the twelve months prior 
to the September of the survey year as virtually all of the fieldwork for each survey year is done from September to December. 
The BHPS does impute some data in constructing this variable.    18    
  
For example, individuals almost surely vary in their degree of risk aversion.  In addition, 
individuals probably vary in their interpretation of the BHPS question.  One individual may think 
about job security in compensated terms and assess satisfaction with job security conditional on 
their wages and any perceived compensating wage differential.  Another individual in otherwise 
similar circumstances may respond without conditioning in this manner. 
  Unmeasured or unobservable individual heterogeneity is, of course, a problem that faces all 
survey research but it seems particularly acute in this analysis where our key variable to be 
explained is answers to a question that permits variation in interpretation.  To address this 
heterogeneity, above and beyond our demographic controls we will exploit the panel structure of 
our data by including individual-specific effects for each respondent. 
  For each year of our panel, Table 1 reports summary statistics of our measure of economic 
insecurity and explanatory variables.  The summary statistics and the analyses reported below are 
based on the BHPS sub-sample of private sector, full-time workers who are not self-employed.  
It is for this group of workers that our theoretical framework most directly applies; at the end of 
Section 4, we discuss the robustness of the results for larger samples.  The average score on the 
insecurity scale is just below 3 in most years, suggesting that the average respondent was fairly 
satisfied with his or her job security. 
  FDI, our key explanatory variable, averages slightly over half in most years—i.e., slightly 
over half of respondents worked in FDI-exposed industries in most years.  Industries that 
satisfied the two conditions for an FDI-exposed sector include metal manufacturing, mechanical 
engineering, and banking and finance.  Among FDI-exposed industries in 1991, the sector with 
the most respondents was mechanical engineering.  The industries meeting the two conditions for 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 For example, category one indicates no qualifications or still in school and no qualifications, and category four includes 
teaching qualifications, first degree, or higher degree.    19    
  
being FDI-exposed vary across each of the nine years of the panel, with sectors such as 
instrument engineering and business services being added to the list.
16  
3.2  Econometric Models 
  By matching each BHPS observation with the relevant industry FDI information, we 
examine how self-assessments of economic insecurity relate to FDI activity.  Our starting point 
is to examine cross-sectional variation in economic insecurity for each year of the panel.  This 
cross-section analysis can be formalized as follows, 
i i i i Z FDI Insecurity ε γ β α + + + =  (1) 
where the subscript i indexes individuals; Insecurityi is our measure of economic insecurity; 
FDIi is our measure of FDI presence; the vector Zi is our set of control regressors discussed 
above; α, β, and γ are parameters to be estimated; and εi is an additive error term.  We treat our 
measure of individual economic insecurity as a normally distributed random variable, and 
estimate the parameters in the equation using ordinary least squares regression with 
heteroskedastic consistent standard errors.
17 
                                                 
16 The two-digit 1980 SIC industries designated as FDI-exposed sectors vary for each of the nine years of our data. To get a sense 
of the variation over time, we list in this footnote the FDI sectors with BHPS respondents for the first and last years of our data. 
In 1991, the FDI-exposed sectors are agriculture & horticulture; coal extraction & manufacture of solid fuels; extraction of 
mineral oil & natural gas; metal manufacturing; chemical industry; production of man-made fibers; manufacture of metal goods 
not elsewhere specified; mechanical engineering; electrical & electronic engineering; manufacture of motor vehicles & parts 
thereof; manufacture of other transport equipment; food, drink & tobacco manufacturing industries; textile industry; manufacture 
of paper & paper products, printing and publishing; processing of rubber & plastics; postal service & telecommunications; 
banking & finance; insurance, except for compulsory social security. In 1999, the FDI-exposed sectors are agriculture & 
horticulture; extraction of mineral oil & natural gas; mineral oil processing; nuclear fuel production; production & distribution of 
electricity, gas, & other forms of energy; water supply industry; metal manufacturing; extraction of minerals not elsewhere 
specified; manufacture of non-metallic mineral products; chemical industry; manufacture of metal goods not elsewhere specified; 
mechanical engineering; manufacture of office machinery & data processing equipment; electrical & electronic engineering; 
manufacture of motor vehicles & parts thereof; manufacture of other transport equipment; instrument engineering; food, drink & 
tobacco manufacturing industries; textile industry; manufacture of leather & leather goods; footwear & clothing industries; 
timber & wooden furniture industries; manufacture of paper & paper products, printing and publishing; processing of rubber & 
plastics; other manufacturing industries; postal service & telecommunications; banking & finance; insurance, except for 
compulsory social security; business services; renting of movables; owning & dealing in real estate; education; research & 
development. 
17 All the cross-sectional results reported below are robust to alternative specifications in which Insecurity is treated as an ordinal 
categorical variable and ordered probits are estimated.    20    
  
  The coefficient estimates of β indicate whether and to what extent individual perceptions of 
economic insecurity are correlated with FDI activity.  Exposure to FDI activity is increasing in 
the variable FDI, and we expect this may be positively correlated with the dependent variable 
Insecurity.  This is the central hypothesis of our empirical work.  Thus, our null hypothesis is that 
β = 0, with the alternative β > 0. 
  Estimating the effect of FDI on insecurity using period-by-period cross-sectional regressions 
is, however, inefficient because it fails to take advantage of all the information available in panel 
data sets (Wawro 2002, Yoon 2000).  Pooling the data across the years of the panel has obvious 
advantages but generates a number of estimation issues regarding individual heterogeneity.   
Since the same respondents are surveyed over time, it is likely that observations for the same 
individual will be more similar than observations across different individuals.  This might be in 
part because there is persistence in an individual’s perceptions of economic insecurity, or 
because there are unmodeled characteristics about the individual that cause them to have similar 
perceptions in each period.  This is particularly pertinent to our analysis because, as discussed 
above, there are good reasons to think that there are unobserved factors that may affect 
perceptions of economic insecurity.  We can model this heterogeneity by revising the cross-
sectional equation for the pooled data, 
it it it i it Z FDI Insecurity ε γ β α + + + =  (2) 
where the variables and parameters are the same as in Equation 1 but now each observation is 
indexed by i and t, for individuals and years.  Further, α is allowed to vary across individuals to 
model unmeasured or unobserved heterogeneity across respondents, and Z  now includes 
dichotomous indicator variables for each year of the survey.    21    
  
  Equation 2 can be estimated via random- or fixed-effects estimators.  The random-effects 
estimator generates consistent parameter estimates if the individual effects are uncorrelated with 
the explanatory variables.  The fixed-effects estimator is also consistent under this assumption, 
but is less efficient.  Under the alternative hypothesis that the individual effects are correlated 
with the explanatory variables, only the fixed-effects estimator is consistent.  We use both 
methods to estimate Equation 2, and report diagnostics to evaluate the estimators. 
 Although  modeling  individual-specific effects is one way of accounting for persistence in 
panel data, it does not allow us to differentiate between the idea that persistence in observations 
of insecurity are accounted for by the influence of past experiences of insecurity on present 
perceptions and the alternative that some types of individuals just have unobserved 
characteristics that lead them to have certain types of perceptions (Green and Yoon 2002, Wawro 
2002).  To make this assessment and to verify the robustness of our estimates of β, it is necessary 
to add a lag of the dependent variable to Equation 2.  The final model we estimate is 
it it it i it it Z FDI urity In Insecurity ε γ β α ρ + + + + = −1 sec (3) 
where ρ is the coefficient on the lag of the dependent variable. 
  This specification is a dynamic panel model.  Introducing a lag of the dependent variable to 
the equation generates correlation between the individual-specific effects and the lag of the 
dependent variable.  Consequently, this equation clearly cannot be estimated using random 
effects.  Moreover, when the number of periods is small, as in our data, the fixed-effects 
estimator is also biased and inconsistent in the presence of a lagged dependent variable.  Wawro 
(2002) reviews a number of alternative estimators for this situation, some of which first-
difference Equation 3 to deal with individual-specific effects and then use instrumental variables 
to address the correlation between the error term and lagged dependent variable generated by the    22    
  
initial transformation of Equation 3.  We use the Arellano-Bond generalized method-of-moments 
estimator, and report diagnostics to evaluate the assumptions required for its valid application. 
4.  Empirical Results 
4.1  Baseline Specifications 
  Table 2 reports the results of our cross-sectional analysis.  These results are ordinary least 
squares coefficient estimates for the parameters in Equation 1, with heteroskedastic consistent 
standard errors.  The key finding is that FDI activity is positively correlated with individual 
economic insecurity.  Holding other factors constant, individuals employed in FDI sectors 
systematically report less satisfaction with their job security.  The coefficient estimate for the 
variable FDI ranges between 0.274 (with a standard error of 0.070) in 1994 to 0.397 (with a 
standard error of 0.071) in 1993.  In every year, the estimated parameter is significantly different 
from zero at at least the 99% level.  Although there is some variation across years in the size of 
the estimate, in most years it is very close to 0.30 and no trend is evident.  Substantively, it 
generally has the largest effect of any of the regressors.  We regard the cross-sectional estimates 
in Table 2 to be strongly consistent with the hypothesis that FDI activity generates economic 
insecurity among workers. 
  The results in Table 2 for the demographic control variables are also of interest.  Older and 
more educated respondents are generally less satisfied with their job security than those who are 
younger and less educated.  The education effect may be related to the “aspiration effect” 
documented in previous studies of general job satisfaction:  more educated workers are thought 
to expect more from all aspects of their jobs, perhaps including job security.  The results also 
indicate that women are more satisfied with their job security than men.  This difference, while 
statistically significant in all years, declines in magnitude over time.  Finally, the estimates in    23    
  
Table 2 indicate an unstable relationship between household income and economic insecurity.  
The only statistically significant estimates are negative, consistent with wealthier households 
being able to self-insure against the risks of job separation and thus more satisfied with their job 
security.  This result, however, holds in only half the years in the panel. 
  Despite the robustness of the correlation between FDI and our measure of economic 
insecurity, there are number of reasons to be concerned about the validity of these inferences.  
The period-by-period cross-sectional analysis is inefficient.  Further, and more importantly, 
unmeasured and perhaps unobservable differences among individuals—such as variation in risk 
aversion—are likely correlated with both perceptions of economic insecurity and the propensity 
to be employed in a FDI exposed sector—correlations which would bias cross-sectional 
parameter estimates.  These issues were discussed in detail in Section 3. 
  To address these concerns, we pooled the panel data sets and explicitly modeled individual-
specific effects as in Equation 2.  Table 3 reports the results of the random-effects and fixed-
effects estimators of this equation.
18  For both estimators, the main substantive finding is, as in 
Table 2, a continued positive correlation between FDI and the dependent variable Insecurity.  
The magnitude of the estimated effect is over twice as large in the random effects specification.  
Both specifications include a full set of year indicator variables; the coefficients of which 
indicate whether mean levels of insecurity deviated in each year from the base year 1991.  The 
parameter estimates are negative for every year except 1992, and turn significantly negative in 
both specifications after 1995.  This indicates lower average levels of insecurity in later years.  It 
                                                 
18 In results not reported, we included the demographic control variables Gender, Education, Age, and Income in the random 
effects specification and Education, Age, and Income in the fixed effects model (Gender is time invariant so cannot be included 
in the fixed effects model). All the results for the FDI parameter are robust to retaining these variables. They were dropped 
because the parameters for these regressors are all not significantly different from zero in our preferred specification in the 
dynamic panel reported below.    24    
  
is broadly consistent with the pattern of U.K. macroeconomic performance over the 1990s:   
initial recession followed by increasingly strong economic growth. 
  Although the main substantive story is the same across the two specifications in Table 3, it is 
still necessary to determine our relative confidence in the two estimators.  We employed the 
Hausman specification test:  if the random-effects assumption that the individual-specific effects 
are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables is true, then coefficient estimates from the two 
models should not be statistically different.  The test statistic is χ
2 distributed with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of coefficients (9 in our application) and is equal to 54.03.  This 
rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients do not differ statistically, and suggests violation 
of the key random-effects assumption.  Consequently, the fixed-effects specification is preferred. 
  It is important to contrast the sources of variation in Tables 2 and 3 that are generating our 
main finding of a positive correlation between FDI presence and economic insecurity.  The 
cross-section estimates of Table 2 exploit variation across individuals in their industry of 
employment and economic insecurity at a single point in time.  In contrast, the panel estimates of 
Table 3 identify off of changes in FDI exposure over time.  Individuals for whom there is no 
change in the FDI activity in their industry and who also do not change their industry of 
employment have their FDI-presence measure fully absorbed by their individual fixed effects.  
Variation across these individuals was used in Table 2 but is not in Table 3.  Instead, 
identification in Table 3 comes from changes over time in individuals’ self-assessments of 
economic insecurity that occur either with changes over time in FDI activity in individuals’ 
industry of employment and/or with changes over time in individuals’ industry of employment. 
  Table 4 reports the results of Equation 3, our application of the Arellano-Bond estimator that 
adds a lag of the dependent variable to our econometric model of economic insecurity.  This    25    
  
addition is substantively of interest because it allows us to differentiate two ideas: the idea that 
persistence in observations of insecurity for any given respondent are accounted for by the 
influence of past experiences of insecurity on present perceptions, and the alternative that some 
types of individuals just have unobserved characteristics that lead them to have certain types of 
perceptions.  Recall that the Arellano-Bond estimator purges individual-specific effects by first-
differencing the data. It then uses instrumental variables to address the correlation between the 
error term and lagged dependent variable generated by the first-differencing. 
  In comparing the results in Table 4 with those in earlier tables, it is important to note that the 
number of individuals and total observations has significantly declined.  First differencing and 
the use of lagged instruments results in the loss of the 1991 and 1992 data altogether.  It also 
means that individuals must be retained in the panel for three years to be included in the analysis. 
  The estimate for the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, ρ, is equal to 0.198 with a 
standard error of 0.021.  This suggests that past shocks to individual perceptions of economic 
insecurity do affect current perceptions though the magnitude of this effect is not large.  In this 
sample, persistence in individual economic insecurity depends both on individual-specific 
characteristics that make some individuals more likely to have particular perceptions and also on 
the effect of past perceptions of insecurity on those in the present. 
  The estimate of the coefficient β is 0.110 with a standard error of 0.049.  To interpret, the 
long-run effect of FDI exposure on economic insecurity, it is necessary to divide this estimate by 
1-ρ (i.e. 1-0.198). Consequently, the estimated impact of FDI exposure on economic insecurity is 
0.137.  The magnitude of this estimate is approximately the same as for the pooled fixed-effects 
estimator reported in Table 3, and it is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  We regard this to 
be a quite rigorous test of our central hypothesis.  A significant correlation between exposure to    26    
  
FDI and perceptions of economic insecurity remains conditional on our controls for individual 
heterogeneity, for the persistence of perceptions of economic insecurity, and for year-to-year 
shocks in insecurity. 
  To assess the validity of the results reported in Table 4, we conducted three diagnostic tests 
recommended by Arellano and Bond (1991). These results are reported in Table 5.
19  T h e  
consistency of their estimator requires that the errors, εit, in Equation 3 are serially uncorrelated.  
Arellano and Bond point out that if this is the case, then the first differenced residuals should 
display negative first-order serial correlation but not second-order serial correlation.  Table 5 
reports that we can reject the null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation but cannot reject 
the null of no second-order serial correlation.  Arellano and Bond also develop a Sargan test that 
helps further assess whether the assumptions about serial correlation hold.  The null hypothesis 
of this test is that the model’s overidentifying restrictions are valid; rejection of the null suggests 
the need to respecify the model (see Arellano and Bond, 1991, and Wawro, 2002). Table 5 
reports that we do not have evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying 
restrictions are valid.  Overall, the three diagnostic tests reported in Table 5 do not raise 
significant concerns about the basic assumptions required for valid implementation of the 
Arellano-Bond estimation results reported in Table 4. 
4.2  Robustness Checks 
  To verify our main findings in Tables 2 through 5, we conducted a number of robustness 
checks.  One important issue is the possibility of estimation bias due to endogeneity and/or 
measurement error.  On endogeneity, it might be argued that individual FDI exposure is not 
strictly exogenous because individuals may choose their industry of employment based (at least 
                                                 
19 Following Arellano and Bond (1991), we report coefficient estimates based on their one-step estimator with robust standard 
errors and diagnostics based on their two-step estimator.    27    
  
partly) on their perceptions of economic insecurity.  Less-secure risk-averse workers might 
choose not to work in FDI-exposed sectors, while risk-loving workers might choose the opposite.  
On measurement error, it might be argued that our key FDI regressor is an imperfect measure of 
the underlying economic concept of interest, the labor-market riskiness linked to multinationals. 
  The endogeneity of worker industry choice is certainly a possibility.  That said, in the panel a 
substantial proportion of changes over time in individual FDI exposure arise from changes in 
industry FDI status, which are clearly exogenous relative to individual perceptions, rather than 
from changes in individual industry of employment.  Moreover, to the extent that people do 
switch industries endogenously, this should bias the coefficient on FDI exposure in the negative 
direction—away from the hypothesized positive effect.  These considerations mean that our 
results reported in Tables 2 through 5 may underestimate the effect of FDI exposure on 
perceptions of economic insecurity.  
  Nonetheless, both to relax the strict exogeneity assumption and to address measurement 
concerns, we used the panel structure of the data by allowing previous errors—i.e., unforecasted 
realizations of Insecurity—to influence future changes in FDI.  The model estimated is the same 
dynamic panel reported in Table 4, but now our FDI regressor is instrumented for using its 
lagged levels and changes in the same way that the Arellano-Bond estimator uses instruments for 
the lagged dependent variable.  This approach accounts for potential endogeneity, and it also 
generates consistent estimates on FDI in the presence of random measurement error. 
  The results of this analysis are reported in the first column of Table 6.  As expected, the 
coefficient estimate on FDI is substantially larger than before:  the implied long-run effect is 
now 0.34, well over twice as large as the estimate in Table 4.  Although the standard error is also 
now relatively larger, the coefficient estimate is still significant at the 0.15 level.  One method    28    
  
for evaluating whether relaxing the strict exogeneity assumption is warranted is comparing the p-
value of Sargan test in the two specifications.  Since the p-values are essentially identical, there 
is little evidence that the specification in Table 6 is preferred.  Based on our results in this table 
and our related discussions, we conclude that endogeneity and measurement error are not serious 
problems for the key result that FDI exposure influences perceptions of economic insecurity.
20 
  Another important issue we considered was specification choice and potential omitted-
variable bias.  For example, all the empirical evidence in Section 2.3 on how multinationals 
influence labor-demand elasticities involves the manufacturing sector only.  That suggests that 
the FDI regressor might actually be capturing something about manufacturing, not FDI.  To test 
for this possibility we constructed and included in regressions the dichotomous variable 
Manufacturing, equal to one if an individual worked in a manufacturing industry and zero 
otherwise.
21  In both cross-section and pooled analyses, our FDI estimates were not substantially 
affected by including this variable (which usually had a positive and significant coefficient only 
in the cross sections).  The second column of Table 6 reports one such pooled estimate.  
  A second specification check we tried was to add to the regressions reported in Tables 3, 4, 
and 6 our various demographic controls from Table 2.  These had no effect on our key FDI 
regressor, and in our preferred dynamic panel specification, none of the estimated coefficients 
for the demographic variables are significantly different from zero.  One final check we mention 
is sensitivity to estimation sample.  Our core results are for a sample of private-sector, full-time, 
not-self-employed workers—the labor market participants for which the theoretical framework 
                                                 
20 For measurement error, we also investigated whether small changes in the industry-by-industry coding of the FDI variable had 
any effect on its coefficient estimates. For example, we re-estimated all tables when agriculture and mining industries were not 
included as possible FDI-exposed industries.  All changes we investigated had minimal impact on our core results. 
21 The one-digit SIC industries that constitute manufacturing are manufacture of metals, mineral products, and chemicals; metal 
goods, engineering, and vehicle industries; and other manufacturing industries.    29    
  
most directly applies.  In estimates of key specifications using broader BHPS samples, our FDI-
insecurity correlation of interest maintained. 
5. Conclusions 
  A central question in political and academic debates about international economic integration 
is whether globalization increases economic insecurity.  In this paper, we present a theoretical 
framework clarifying a critical mechanism through which globalization can increase individual 
economic insecurity.  Drawing on standard frameworks of labor economics, we argue that FDI 
by multinational enterprises (MNEs) may be an important factor generating worker insecurity.  
FDI by MNEs may increase firms’ elasticity of demand for labor.  More-elastic labor demands, 
in turn, raise the volatility of wages and employment, all of which tends to make workers feel 
more insecure.  It is important to note that this link from higher labor-demand elasticities to 
greater labor-market volatility does not require any change in aggregate shocks to the labor 
market: it holds even for some fixed amount of aggregate volatility. 
  We then provide the first empirical test at the individual level of the relationship between the 
multinationalization of production and the economic insecurity of workers.  Our analysis of 
panel data from Great Britain over the 1990s finds that FDI activity in the industries in which 
individuals work is positively correlated with individual perceptions of economic insecurity.   
This relationship holds in yearly cross-sections, in a panel accounting for individual-specific 
effects, and in a dynamic panel model also accounting for individual-specific effects. 
Consequently, it is not only true that individuals more exposed to FDI activity are more likely to 
report greater insecurity but also the case that changes in exposure for a single individual, 
controlling for previous levels of insecurity, are correlated with changes in worker insecurity.    30    
  
We regard the individual-level panel results as the first valid evidence consistent with a causal 
relationship between globalization and worker insecurity.    31    
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics 
                             
   Year 
Variable  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
                             
Insecurity  2.978  3.026  2.902  2.917  2.881  2.789  2.682  2.663  2.726 
   (1.982)  (1.747)  (1.663)  (1.701)  (1.642)  (1.563)  (1.532)  (1.465)  (1.579) 
FDI  0.425  0.425  0.612  0.551  0.573  0.625  0.584  0.599  0.582 
   (0.494)  (0.494)  (0.487)  (0.497)  (0.495)  (0.484)  (0.493)  (0.490)  (0.493) 
Gender  0.349  0.353  0.363  0.369  0.352  0.356  0.349  0.352  0.346 
   (0.477)  (0.478)  (0.481)  (0.483)  (0.478)  (0.479)  (0.477)  (0.478)  (0.476) 
Education  2.262  2.325  2.399  2.437  2.468  2.511  2.540  2.558  2.539 
   (0.897)  (0.893)  (0.898)  (0.910)  (0.905)  (0.901)  (0.884)  (0.870)  (0.877) 
Age  35.459  35.563  35.425  35.447  35.644  35.550  35.508  35.809  36.111 
   (12.017)  (11.719)  (11.572)  (11.574)  (11.566)  (11.527)  (11.723)  (11.885)  (11.718) 
Income  23.778  25.278  25.902  26.486  27.804  29.319  29.666  30.572  30.721 
   (13.564)  (14.126)  (13.596)  (14.564)  (15.789)  (16.417)  (17.260)  (20.565)  (22.782) 
                             
Observations   2,649    2,385    2,280    2,410    2,377    2,525    2,695    3,060    4,059  
Notes:  The BHPS sample in each year is private-sector, full-time workers who are not self-employed.  Each cell reports the variable mean and, in parentheses, its 
standard deviation.  Insecurity takes values from 1 to 7, with higher values indicating greater job insecurity.  FDI is a dichotomous variable equal to one in 
industries with FDI presence as defined in the text.  Gender is a dichotomous variable equal to one for females.  Education takes values from 1 to 4, with higher 
values indicating more education.  Age is age in years.  Income is household income in thousands of pounds. 
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Table 2:  Cross-Sectional Analysis of Economic Insecurity 
 
                             
   Year 
Regressor  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
                             
FDI  0.311  0.322  0.397  0.274  0.315  0.278  0.296  0.371  0.300 
   (0.079)  (0.073)  (0.071)  (0.070)  (0.069)  (0.063)  (0.060)  (0.053)  (0.050) 
Gender  -0.289  -0.334  -0.285  -0.336  -0.164  -0.158  -0.109  -0.176  -0.106 
   (0.081)  (0.074)  (0.071)  (0.070)  (0.071)  (0.064)  (0.063)  (0.054)  (0.052) 
Education  0.062  0.113  0.135  0.078  0.189  0.128  0.011  0.047  0.000 
   (0.045)  (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.039)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.032)  (0.030) 
Age  0.009  0.007  0.011  0.012  0.011  0.009  0.011  0.011  0.010 
   (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Income  -0.001  0.000  -0.005  0.001  -0.005  0.000  -0.003  -0.002  -0.003 
   (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Constant  2.519  2.497  2.174  2.230  2.031  2.027  2.232  2.059  2.318 
   (0.186)  (0.175)  (0.168)  (0.165)  (0.160)  (0.152)  (0.150)  (0.135)  (0.127) 
                             
S.E.R.  1.967  1.726  1.636  1.679  1.619  1.548  1.519  1.444  1.566 
Observations  2,649  2,385  2,280  2,410  2,377  2,525  2,695  3,060  4,059 
Notes:  These results are ordinary least squares regression coefficient estimates for each year for equation (1).  Each cell reports the coefficient estimate and, in 
parentheses, its heteroskedastic-consistent standard error.  For variable definitions, see the notes to Table 1.    
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Table 3:  Panel Analysis of Economic Insecurity, 1991-1999 
 
                    
Regressor    
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects    
                    
FDI     0.234  0.105    
      (0.024)  (0.032)    
Year 1992     0.067  0.099    
      (0.038)  (0.039)    
Year 1993     -0.092  -0.027    
      (0.039)  (0.041)    
Year 1994     -0.069  -0.014    
      (0.038)  (0.041)    
Year 1995     -0.090  -0.020    
      (0.039)  (0.042)    
Year 1996     -0.196  -0.127    
      (0.038)  (0.042)    
Year 1997     -0.280  -0.205    
      (0.038)  (0.041)    
Year 1998     -0.295  -0.203    
      (0.037)  (0.042)    
Year 1999     -0.243  -0.174    
      (0.036)  (0.042)    
Constant     2.832  2.855    
      (0.031)  (0.032)    
                    
              
Observations      24,636    24,636     
Individuals      7,320    7,320     
T      1 ≤ T ≤ 9    1 ≤ T ≤ 9     
Notes:  Each cell reports the coefficient estimate and, in parentheses, its standard error for equation (2).  For variable 
definitions, see the notes to Table 1.    
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Table 4:  Dynamic Panel Analysis 
of Economic Insecurity, 1993-1999 
 
              
Regressor   
Arellano-
Bond    
             
∆ Insecurity(t-1)    0.198    
     (0.021)    
∆ FDI    0.110    
     (0.049)    
∆ Year 1993    -0.091    
     (0.041)    
∆ Year 1994    -0.043    
     (0.042)    
∆ Year 1995    -0.002    
     (0.041)    
∆ Year 1996    -0.088    
     (0.039)    
∆ Year 1997    -0.171    
     (0.036)    
∆ Year 1998    -0.093    
     (0.033)    
Constant    -0.025    
     (0.009)    
             
          
Observations     13,377     
Individuals     3,781     
T     1 ≤ T ≤ 7     
Notes:  Each cell reports the coefficient estimate and, in parentheses, its 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard error for equation (3).  For variable 
definitions, see the notes to Table 1.  The Arellano-Bond estimator is a first-
difference estimator so the dependent variable is actually the difference 
between the Insecurity measure in period t and period t-1.The sample estimated 
in this table is two years shorter than in Table 3 because two lags are required 
to estimate the model. 
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Table 5: Specification Tests for Dynamic Panel Analysis of Economic 
Insecurity: 1993-1999 
          
Test  Results   
          
1st-order serial correlation test:      
     Z  -20.43   
     Probability value under null of no autocorrelation  0.000   
       
2nd-order serial correlation test:      
     Z  1.15   
     Probability value under null of no autocorrelation  0.250   
       
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:      
     χ
2(27)  29.45   
     Probability value under null that overidentifying   0.339   
     restrictions are valid      
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Table 6:  Robustness Checks for Pooled Analyses 
      
Regressor   
Arellano-Bond with 
Instruments for FDI 
Arellano-Bond with 
Instruments for FDI   
                  
∆ Insecurity(t-1)  0.230  0.230 
   (0.016)  (0.016) 
∆ FDI  0.260  0.289 
   (0.179)  (0.198) 
∆ Manufacturing    -0.078   
    (0.146)   
∆ Year 1993    -0.115  -0.120   
     (0.051)  (0.053)   
∆ Year 1994    -0.056  -0.059   
     (0.046)  (0.046)   
∆ Year 1995    -0.015  -0.016   
     (0.043)  (0.043)   
∆ Year 1996    -0.109  -0.111   
     (0.043)  (0.043)   
∆ Year 1997    -0.182  -0.181   
     (0.037)  (0.037)   
∆ Year 1998    -0.100  -0.100   
     (0.034)  (0.034)   
Constant    -0.033  -0.034   
  (0.011)  (0.011)   
            
Observations     13,377    13,377    
Individuals     3,781    3,781    
T     1 ≤ T ≤ 7    1 ≤ T ≤ 7    
Notes:  Each cell reports the coefficient estimate and, in parentheses, its heteroskedastic consistent standard error for equation 
(3) relaxing the assumption that the FDI exposure variable, FDI,  is completely exogenous.  In these specifications, 
unforecasted changes in Insecurity are allowed to affect future changes in FDI exposure. Instrumental variables from lagged 
levels and lagged changes in FDI are used in the same way that the Arellano-Bond estimator instruments for the lagged 
dependent variable. For variable definitions, see the notes to Table 1. 
 